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Abstract
We consider minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources. We
propose a cost allocation rule based on a painting procedure. Agents paint
the edges on the paths connecting them to the sources. We prove that the
painting rule coincides with the folk rule. Finally, we provide an axiomatic
characterization.
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1. Introduction
We study situations where a group of agents need services provided by several
sources. Agents need to be connected, directly or indirectly, to all sources. Every
connection is costly. Situations of this kind are called minimum cost spanning
tree problems with multiple sources and are extensions of the classical minimum
cost spanning tree problem (where there is a single source).
The first issue addressed is to find the least costly networks connecting all
agents with all sources. Obviously, such a network is a tree. It can also be found
in polynomial time using the same algorithms as in the classical problem (e.g.,
Kruskal (1956) and Prim (1957)).
The second issue addressed is how to allocate the cost of the tree obtained
among the agents. Several papers have studied this issue in minimum cost span-
ning tree problems, but as far as we know only three have considered it in the
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case of multiple sources. Rosenthal (1987) and Kuipers (1997) study a situation
slightly different from this paper, whereas Bergantin˜os et al. (2017) study the
same situation as we present here. Rosenthal (1987) considers situations where
all sources provide the same service and agents want to be connected to at least
one of them. He considers a cooperative game and studies the core of that
game. Kuipers (1997) considers situations where each source offers a different
service and each agent needs to be connected to a subset of the sources. He also
considers a cooperative game and seeks to determine under what conditions the
core is non-empty. Bergantin˜os et al. (2017) study the same situation as in this
paper. They extend different definitions of the folk rule, defined for classical
minimum cost spanning tree problems, to the case of multiple sources. They
also present some axiomatic characterizations of the folk rule.
In classical minimum cost spanning tree problems the folk rule is one of
the most important rules. It has been studied in several papers, including
Bergantin˜os and Kar (2010), Bergantin˜os et al. (2010, 2011, 2014), Bergantin˜os
and Vidal-Puga (2007, 2009), Branzei et al. (2004), and Tijs et al. (2006).
Our paper is closely related to that of Bergantin˜os et al. (2014). They
study a general framework of connection problems involving a single source,
which contains classical minimum cost spanning tree problems. They propose
a cost allocation rule, called the painting rule because it can be interpreted
through a painting story. The idea is the following: start with a tree t; for each
agent, identify the unique path in t from that agent to the source. Agents start
painting the first edge on that path. Following a protocol, an agent continues
painting until all edges on her path have been painted. They also give some
axiomatic characterizations of the painting rule. They prove that the painting
rule coincides with the folk rule in classical minimal cost spanning tree problem.
Thus, they obtain a new way of computing the folk rule and a new axiomatic
characterization.
The first objective of this paper is to extend the definition of the painting
rule to the case of minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources.
The main problem that arises when doing this is that given a tree and an agent,
several paths in the tree could connect the agent to a source. In order to avoid
this problem, we define a two-phase procedure: In Phase 1, given a tree t, we
compute a tree t∗ with the same cost as t such that t∗ is also a tree when it
is restricted to the set of sources. Notice that for each agent there is a unique
path in t∗ connecting the agent with the set of all sources. In Phase 2 we apply
the ideas of the painting rule to the tree t∗. This extension of the painting rule
is not straightforward because it could depend on the tree t considered initially
and the tree t∗ computed in Phase 1, which is not determined solely by t. In
Proposition 2 we prove that for each tree t and t∗ considered, the painting rule
always coincide with the folk rule. Thus, the painting rule is independent of the
trees t and t∗ considered.
The second objective of the paper is to provide an axiomatic characterization
of the folk rule in minimum cost spanning trees with multiple sources. We do
this with the properties of cost monotonicity, symmetry, cone-wise additivity,
isolated agents, and equal treatment of source costs. The first three properties
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are quite standard in the literature and are defined as in the classical minimum
cost spanning tree problem. Cost monotonicity says that if the connection
cost between two nodes increases, no agent can be better off. Symmetry says
that agents with the same connection costs to other nodes must pay the same.
Cone-wise additivity says that the rule should be additive on the cost function
when it is restricted to cones. The isolated agents property is inspired by the
property (also called isolated agents) introduced in Bergantin˜os et al. (2014).
Nevertheless, the extension is not so straightforward as with the previous ones.
An agent is isolated when all her connection costs are the same and she does
not benefit from connecting to the sources through the rest of the agents. If
all sources can be connected to one another for free, then an isolated agent
should only pay her connection cost to any node. Equal treatment of source
costs is a property defined only in the case of multiple sources. It is introduced
in Bergantin˜os et al. (2017) and states that if the connection cost between two
sources increases then all agents must be affected in the same way.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces minimum cost span-
ning tree problems with multiple sources. Section 3 introduces the painting rule.
Section 4 gives the axiomatic characterization.
2. The minimum cost spanning tree problem with multiple sources
We consider situations where a group of nodes N (called agents) wants to
be connected to a set of suppliers M (called sources).
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the finite set of agents and M = {a1, ..., am} the finite
set of sources. There is a cost matrix C = (cij)i,j∈N∪M over N ∪M representing
the cost of the direct link between any pair of nodes, with cji = cij ≥ 0 and
cii = 0, for all i, j ∈ N ∪M . We denote by CN∪M the set of all cost matrices
over N ∪M .
A minimum cost spanning tree problem with multiple sources (briefly, a prob-
lem) is a triple (N,M,C) where N is the set of agents, M is the set of sources
and C ∈ CN∪M is the cost matrix. If cij ∈ {0, 1}, for all i, j ∈ N ∪M , then
(N,M,C) is called a simple problem.
An edge is a non-ordered pair (i, j) such that i, j ∈ N ∪M . Sometimes we
write ij instead of (i, j). A network g is a subset of edges. The cost associated
with a network g is defined as
c(N,M,C, g) =
∑
(i,j)∈g
cij .
When there are no ambiguities, we write c(g) or c(C, g) instead of c(N,M,C, g).
Given a network g and any pair of nodes i and j, a path from i to j in g is
a sequence of distinct edges gij = {(ih−1, ih)}qh=1 satisfying that (ih−1, ih) ∈ g
for all h = 1, ..., q, i = i0 and j = iq. A cycle is a path from i to i with at least
two edges. A tree is a graph without cycles that connects all the elements of
N ∪M .
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Two nodes i, j are connected in g if there exists a path from i to j. We say
that S ⊆ N ∪M is a connected component on g if every i, j ∈ S are connected
in g and S is maximal, i.e., for each T ∈ N ∪M with S ( T there exist k, l ∈ T ,
k 6= l, such that k and l are not connected in g.
Let (N,M,C) be a simple problem. We denote by g0,C the network induced
by the edges with zero cost. Namely, g0,C = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ N ∪M and cij = 0}.
We say that i, j ∈ S ⊆ N ∪M are (C, S)-connected if i and j are connected in
g0,C . We say that S is a C-component if S is a connected component on g0,C .
The first issue addressed in the literature is how to find a tree with the lowest
associated cost (which is not necessarily unique). This problem is polynomial
and the algorithms of Kruskal (1956) and Prim (1957) enable such a tree, which
is called minimal tree (mt), to be computed. We denote by m(N,M,C) the
cost of any mt in (N,M,C).
Let (N,M,C) be a problem and t a minimal tree in (N,M,C). For each
i, j ∈ N ∪M we denote by tij the unique path in t joining i and j. Bird (1976)
defines the minimal network associated with the minimal tree t as the problem
(N,M,Ct), where ctij = max(k,l)∈tij ckl. It is well known that C
t is independent
of the chosen t. Then, the irreducible problem (N,M,C∗) of (N,M,C) is defined
as the minimal network associated with any minimal tree of (N,M,C).
After obtaining a minimal tree, the second issue addressed is how to divide
its cost among the agents. A cost allocation rule (briefly, a rule) is a mapping
f that associates a vector f(N,M,C) ∈ RN with each problem (N,M,C) such
that
∑
i∈N fi(N,M,C) = m(N,M,C). The i-th element of f(N,M,C) denotes
the payment of agent i ∈ N .
One of the most popular rules in the classical minimum cost spanning tree
problem (mcstp) is the folk rule. Bergantin˜os et al. (2017) extend the definition
of the folk rule to the problem with multiple sources and provide several ways
to obtain it. One of them is through cone-wise decomposition.
Norde et al. (2004) prove that every classical mcstp can be written as a non-
negative combination of classical simple problems. What follows is an adapta-
tion of this result to our context.
Lemma 1. For each problem (N,M,C), there exists a positive number m(C) ∈
N, a sequence {Cq}m(C)q=1 of simple cost matrices and a sequence {xq}m(C)q=1 of
non-negative real numbers satisfying three conditions:
(1) C =
m(C)∑
q=1
xqCq.
(2) For each q ∈ {1, . . . ,m(C)}, there exists a network gq such that cqij = 1 if
(i, j) ∈ gq and cqij = 0 otherwise.
(3) Take q ∈ {1, . . . ,m(C)} and {i, j, k, l} ⊂ N ∪ M . If cij ≤ ckl, then
cqij ≤ cqkl.
Let (N,M,C) be a simple problem and P = {S1, ..., Sp} the partition of
N ∪M in C-components. Bergantin˜os et al. (2017) define the folk rule F for
simple problems as follows.
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Fi(N,M,C) =

|Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N | , if S(i, P ) ∩M 6= ∅
1
|S(i, P )| +
|Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N | , otherwise,
where S(i, P ) is the element of P to which i belongs to. Then, the folk rule for
a general problem (N,M,C) is defined as
F (N,M,C) =
m(C)∑
q=1
xqF (N,M,Cq).
3. The painting procedure
Given a fixed tree t, Bergantin˜os et al. (2014) provide an algorithm to define
a rule through a painting procedure in the classical mcstp. They motivate it as
follows.
“ In order to illustrate the procedure used to obtain the rule, assume that the
nodes represent the houses of the different agents and the edges are the canals
which connect them to an irrigation point. These canals need painting and there
is only one machine to do this for each one. The machines cannot be moved
to another canal and all of them work at the same speed. At every stage, each
agent is assigned to an edge while the path from his house to the source has not
been completely painted. The canals in t have painters assigned to them if the
painting has not been completed. In each step, the agents assigned to an edge
which is not completely painted share equally the time the painting machine is
in operation. This can be read as their paying the same cost in that segment.
At stage 1, each agent is assigned to the first edge in the unique path in t from
his house to the source. At stage s, each agent is assigned to the first unpaid
edge in this unique path. If all edges in such a path have already been paid for
in the previous stages, then this agent has finished his job. The procedure ends
when all edges have been paid for completely.”
We seek to apply the procedure described above to the case of multiple
sources. The main problem that arises is that with multiple sources, given a
tree t and an agent i, several paths in t could connect agent i to a source in
M . Assume that in the tree t all sources are directly connected to one another
(namely tM , the restriction of t to M , is also a tree). In this case, there is only
one path in t to connect each agent to the nearest source.
Our idea for extending the definition of Bergantin˜os et al. (2014) to the case
of multiple sources is the following. First, given a problem (N,M,C) and an
mt t in (N,M,C), we compute a tree t∗ in (N,M,C∗) with the same cost as t
such that t∗M is also a tree. Second, we divide the cost of t
∗\t∗M using the same
procedure as in Bergantin˜os et al. (2014) and the cost of t∗M is divided equally
among all agents.
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We now give an example where we explain the above procedure intuitively.
It is presented formally below.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, M = {a1, a2, a3, a4}, c3a3 = 1, c14 = 2,
c23 = 3, c4a4 = 4, c34 = 5, c1a1 = 6, ca2a3 = 7 and cij = 10 otherwise. The
minimal tree t for this problem is represented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Minimal tree for (N,M,C).
Notice that the sources are not directly connected to one another. Every
agent (except for agent 2) has several paths in t connecting her to a source.
For instance, agent 1 could connect to source a1 through path {(1, a1)} or could
connect to source a4 through path {(1, 4), (4, a4)}.
We now construct the tree t∗. We first connect sources a1 and a31. We
remove from t the most expensive edge on the unique path in t joining a1 and
a3, which is edge (1, a1). We add to t the edge (a1, a3) and we change its cost
from 10 to 6 (the cost of edge (1, a1)).
We now connect sources a3 and a4. We remove from t the most expensive
edge on the unique path in t joining a3 and a4, which is edge (3, 4). We add to
t the edge (a3, a4) and we change its cost from 10 to 5 (the cost of edge (3, 4)).
Figure 2 shows the modified tree.
In this tree, each agent has a unique path to the set of sources. The path
for agent 1 is {(1, 4), (4, a4)}, for agent 2 it is {(2, 3), (3, a3)}, for agent 3 it is
{(3, a3)} and for agent 4 it is {(4, a4)}. Then, the original idea of the painting
procedure can be applied.
Stage 1. Agent 1 selects edge (1, 4), agent 2 selects (2, 3), agent 3 selects
(3, a3), and agent 4 selects (4, a4). Thus, agent 3 paints edge (3, a3) completely
and agents 1, 2 and 4 paint one unit of their edges. Thus, agent 3 is already
connected to source a3 and she is removed from the procedure.
Stage 2. Agents 1, 2 and 4 select the same edges as in Stage 1. Edge (1, 4)
is completely painted by agent 1. One more unit of edges (2, 3) and (4, a4) is
painted by agent 2 and 4, respectively.
1Note that this procedure depends on the sources chosen for connecting. For instance,
instead of joining sources a1 and a3 it is possible to join sources a1 and a4. Later we prove
that the cost allocation is independent of the choices made.
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Figure 2: Alternative tree.
Stage 3. Agent 2 keeps selecting edge (2, 3) and agents 1 and 4 select edge
(4, a4). Agent 2 paints one unit of edge (2, 3). Agents 1 and 4 paint
1
2 of edge
(4, a4). Thus, edge (2, 3) is completely painted and agent 2 is therefore connected
to source a3 (through agent 3) and she is removed from the procedure.
Stage 4. Agents 1 and 4 keep selecting edge (4, a4). Each agent paints
1
2 of
edge (4, a4), which is now completely painted. Then, both agents are connected
to source a4 and removed from the procedure.
Stage 5. The edges connecting the sources ((a1, a3), (a2, a3) and (a3, a4))
are painted by all agents.
Table 1 summarizes this procedure.
Agent → Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 4
Stage ↓ Edge Amount Edge Amount Edge Amount Edge Amount
Stage 1 (1, 4) 1 (2, 3) 1 (3, a3) 1 (4, a4) 1
Stage 2 (1, 4) 1 (2, 3) 1 (4, a4) 1
Stage 3 (4, a4)
1
2 (2, 3) 1 (4, a4)
1
2
Stage 4 (4, a4)
1
2 (4, a4)
1
2
Stage 5 t∗M
6+7+5
4 t
∗
M
6+7+5
4 t
∗
M
6+7+5
4 t
∗
M
6+7+5
4
Total 152
15
2
11
2
15
2
Table 1: Summary of the painting procedure.
We now formally introduce the procedure explained in Example 1. We con-
sider a two-phase procedure. In the first phase, given any mt t, we construct a
tree t∗ with the same cost as t and where all the sources are connected to one
another. In the second phase we apply the painting procedure as in Bergantin˜os
et al. (2014).
Phase 1: Constructing the tree
Given a mcstp with multiple sources (N,M,C) and a minimal tree t in
(N,M,C), let P (tM ) = {S1, ..., Sm(t)} denote the partition of M in connected
7
components induced by tM .
We consider an algorithm to construct a minimal tree t∗ of the irreducible
problem (N,M,C∗).
We start with t0 = t. Assume that stage β is defined, for all β ≤ δ − 1.
Stage δ: We have two cases,
• P (tδ−1M ) = {M}. The algorithm ends and t∗ = tδ−1.
• P (tδ−1M ) 6= {M}. We define
E(tδ−1) = {(ih−1, ih)}qh=1
as the unique path from
⋃δ
r=1 Sr to Sδ+1 in t
δ−1, with i0 ∈
⋃δ
r=1 Sr,
iq ∈ Sδ+1, i1 /∈
⋃δ
r=1 Sr and iq−1 /∈ Sδ+1.
Let (i, j) be the most expensive edge in E(tδ−1) (if there are several edges,
then select just one). Namely,
cij = max
(k,l)∈E(tδ−1)
{ckl}.
We now define,
tδ = tδ−1\(i, j) ∪ (i0, iq).
This process is completed in a finite number of stages (exactly at m(t) − 1
stages and 1 ≤ m(t) ≤ m). The tree t∗ is a mt for (N,M,C∗). Besides
c(C∗, t∗) = c(C, t) and t∗M is also a tree.
Notice that given a tree t, several trees t∗ could be obtained through this
procedure.
We now formally apply Phase 1 to Example 1. We start with
t0 = t = {(1, a1), (1, 4), (4, a4), (2, 3), (3, a3), (3, 4), (a2, a3)}.
Stage 1 :
• P (t0M ) = {{a1}, {a2, a3}, {a4}}. Then
E(t0) = {(a1, 1), (1, 4), (4, 3), (3, a3)}.
The most expensive edge in E(t0) is (1, a1). Thus
t1 = {(a1, a3), (1, 4), (4, a4), (2, 3), (3, a3), (3, 4), (a2, a3)}.
Stage 2 :
• P (t1M ) = {{a1, a2, a3}, {a4}}. Then
E(t1) = {(a3, 3), (3, 4), (4, a4)}.
The most expensive edge in E(t1) is (3, 4). Thus
t2 = {(a1, a3), (1, 4), (4, a4), (2, 3), (3, a3), (a3, a4), (a2, a3)}.
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Stage 3 :
• P (t2M ) = {{a1, a2, a3, a4}}. Then the algorithm ends and t∗ = t2.
We know formally define the second phase of our procedure. This phase is
obtained by applying the same ideas as in the painting procedure of Bergantin˜os
et al. (2014).
Phase 2: Painting the tree.
Let t∗ be an mt in (N,N,C∗) satisfying that t∗M is a tree over M and
c(N,M,C∗, t∗) = m(N,M,C). By Phase 1 we know that such tree exists. We
take
• e0i (C, t∗) = ∅ for all i ∈ N. In general, eδi (C, t∗) denotes the edge of t∗
assigned to agent i at stage δ. Agent i will pay part of the cost of this
edge.
• c0(C, t∗) = 0 and cδ(C, t∗) represents the part of the cost of each edge that
it is paid at stage δ.
• p0i (C, t∗) = 0 for all i ∈ N . In general, pδi (C, t∗) is the cost that agent i
pays at stage δ.
• E0(C, t∗) = t∗\t∗M and Eδ(C, t∗) is the set of unpaid edges of t∗\t∗M at
stage δ.
When no confusion arises we will write eδi , e
δ
i (C) or e
δ
i (t
∗) instead of eδi (C, t
∗).
We will do the same with cδ(C, t∗), pδi (C, t
∗) and Eδ(C, t∗). Assume that stage
β is defined, for all β ≤ δ − 1.
Stage δ:
• For each i ∈ N , let eδi be the first edge in the unique path in t∗ from i
to M belonging to Eδ−1. If all edges in such path are not in Eδ−1, take
eδi = ∅.
• For each (i, j) ∈ Eδ−1 we define
Nδij = {k ∈ N : eδk = (i, j)}
and
cδ = min
{
cij −
δ−1∑
r=0
cr : (i, j) ∈ Eδ−1
}
.
• For each i ∈ N , we define
pδi =

cδ∣∣∣Nδ
eδi
∣∣∣ , if eδi 6= ∅
0, otherwise.
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• We define
Eδ =
{
(i, j) ∈ Eδ−1 :
δ∑
r=0
cr < cij
}
.
This procedure ends when we find a stage γ(C, t∗) (γ(C), γ(t∗) or γ when
no confusion arises) such that Eγ = ∅. Since E0 = t∗\t∗M , Eδ+1 ⊂ Eδ and
Eδ+1 6= Eδ, γ is finite.
Stage γ + 1. The cost of all edges on t∗M , c(t
∗
M ) =
∑
(i,j)∈t∗M c
∗
ij , is divided
equally among all agents. Then,
pγ+1i =
c(t∗M )
|N | .
For each problem (N,M,C), each mt t, and each i ∈ N , we define the
panting rule fP,ti as
fP,ti (N,M,C) =
γ+1∑
δ=1
pδi (C, t
∗).
Note that this definition depends on trees t and t∗ considered.
We now formally apply Phase 2 to Example 1. We start with:
• e01, e02, e03, e04 = ∅.
• c0 = 0.
• p01, p02, p03, p04 = 0.
• E0 = {(1, 4), (4, a4), (2, 3), (3, a3)}.
Stage 1:
• e11 = (1, 4), e12 = (2, 3), e13 = (3, a3) and e14 = (4, a4).
• N114 = {1}, N123 = {2}, N13a3 = {3} and N14a4 = {4}.
• c1 = min{c14, c23, c3a3 , c4a4} = min{2, 3, 1, 4} = 1.
• p11, p12, p13, p14 = 1.
• E1 = {(1, 4), (4, a4), (2, 3)}.
Stage 2:
• e21 = (1, 4), e22 = (2, 3), e23 = ∅ and e24 = (4, a4).
• N214 = {1}, N223 = {2} and N24a4 = {4}.
• c2 = min{c14 − 1, c23 − 1, c4a4 − 1} = min{2− 1, 3− 1, 4− 1} = 1.
• p21 = 1, p22 = 1, p23 = 0 and p24 = 1.
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• E2 = {(2, 3), (4, a4)}.
Stage 3:
• e31 = (4, a4), e32 = (2, 3), e33 = ∅ and e34 = (4, a4).
• N323 = {2} and N34a4 = {1, 4}.
• c3 = min{c23 − 2, c4a4 − 2} = min{3− 2, 4− 2} = 1.
• p31 = 12 , p32 = 1, p33 = 0 and p34 = 12 .
• E3 = {(4, a4)}.
Stage 4:
• e41 = (4, a4), e42 = ∅, e43 = ∅ and e44 = (4, a4).
• N44a4 = {1, 4}.
• c4 = min{c4a4 − 3} = min{4− 3} = 1.
• p41 = 12 , p42 = 0, p43 = 0 and p44 = 12 .
• E4 = ∅. Thus, γ = 4.
Stage 5: For each i ∈ N ,
p5i =
c(t∗M )
4
=
18
4
=
9
2
.
Then,
fP1 (N,M,C) = 1 + 1 +
1
2
+
1
2
+
9
2
=
15
2
,
fP2 (N,M,C) = 1 + 1 + 1 + 0 +
9
2
=
15
2
,
fP3 (N,M,C) = 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 +
9
2
=
11
2
,
fP4 (N,M,C) = 1 + 1 +
1
2
+
1
2
+
9
2
=
15
2
.
We now show that the solution does not actually depend on the minimal
tree t considered initially and the tree t∗ defined in Phase 1. To that end, we
introduce two propositions.
Proposition 1. Let (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′) be two mcstp with multiple sources
satisfying that there is an order σ over the set of edges of N ∪M such that for
all i, j, k, l ∈ N ∪M satisfying that σ(i, j) < σ(k, l), then cij ≤ ckl and c′ij ≤ c′kl.
Let t be a minimal tree in C, C ′, and C + C ′. Then,
fP,t(N,M,C + C ′) = fP,t(N,M,C) + fP,t(N,M,C ′).
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Proof. Applying Phase 1 to t, we can obtain a common mt t∗ for (N,M,C∗),
(N,M,C ′∗) and (N,M,C∗ + C ′∗).
We now compute Phase 2. First, consider the case when for all i, j, k, l ∈
N ∪ M satisfying that σ(i, j) < σ(k, l), then cij < ckl and c′ij < c′kl. Thus
cij + c
′
ij < ckl + c
′
kl. For all i ∈ N , let iM ∈ N ∪M denote the immediate
successor of i in the unique path from i to M in t∗. Without loss of generality,
we assume that ciiM < cjjM when i < j, for all i, j ∈ N . Then,
Stage 1 :
• ∀i ∈ N , e1i (C) = e1i (C ′) = e1i (C + C ′) = (i, iM ).
• ∀i ∈ N , N1iiM (C) = N1iiM (C ′) = N1iiM (C + C ′) = {i}.
• c1(C) = min
i∈N
{ciiM } = c11M ,
c1(C ′) = min
i∈N
{c′iiM } = c′11M and
c1(C + C ′) = min
i∈N
{ciiM + c′iiM } = c11M + c′11M .
• ∀i ∈ N , p1i (C) = c11M , p1i (C ′) = c′11M and p1i (C + C ′) = c11M + c′11M .
• E1(C) = E1(C ′) = E1(C + C ′) = {(i, iM )}|M |i=2.
Then, for all i ∈ N , p1i (C + C ′) = p1i (C) + p1i (C ′).
Stage 2 :
• ∀i ∈ N\1, e2i (C) = e1i (C), e2i (C ′) = e1i (C ′) and e2i (C + C ′) = e1i (C + C ′).
If 1M ∈ M then e2i (C) = e2i (C ′) = e2i (C + C ′) = ∅. If 1M /∈ M then
e2i (C) = e
2
i (C
′) = e2i (C + C
′) = e11M (C).
Then, ∀i ∈ N , e2i (C) = e2i (C ′) = e2i (C + C ′).
• N2iiM (C) = N2iiM (C ′) = N2iiM (C + C ′), for all i ∈ N\{1}.
• c2(C) = min
i∈N\{1}
{ciiM − c1(C)} = c22M − c11M ,
c2(C ′) = min
i∈N\{1}
{c′iiM − c1(C ′)} = c′22M − c′11M and
c2(C +C ′) = min
i∈N\{1}
{ciiM + c′iiM − c1(C +C ′)} = c22M + c′22M − (c11M +
c′11M ).
• ∀i ∈ N , p2i (C) =
c22M − c11M
|N2
e2i
(C)| , p
2
i (C
′) =
c′22M − c′11M
|N2
e2i
(C ′)| and
p2i (C + C
′) =
c22M + c
′
22M − (c11M + c′11M )
|N2
e2i
(C + C ′)| .
• E2(C) = E2(C ′) = E2(C + C ′) = {(i, iM )}|M |i=2.
Then ∀i ∈ N , p2i (C + C ′) = p2i (C) + p2i (C ′).
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Repeating this argument, we can prove that γ(C) = γ(C ′) = γ(C +C ′) and
that for each stage δ = 1, ..., γ and for every i ∈ N , we have that pγi (C + C ′) =
pγi (C)+p
γ
i (C
′). Besides, for every i ∈ N , pγ+1i (C) =
c(t∗M )
|N | , p
γ+1
i (C
′) =
c′(t∗M )
|N |
and pγ+1i (C + C
′) =
c(t∗M ) + c
′(t∗M )
|N | . Thus,
fP,t(N,M,C + C ′) = fP,t(N,M,C) + fP,t(N,M,C ′).
Now, consider the general case when, if σ(i, j) < σ(k, l), then cij ≤ ckl and
c′ij ≤ c′kl. Let Cε and C ′ε be two cost functions such that:
• For each i, j ∈ N ∪M , cij − ε ≤ cεij ≤ cij + ε and c′ij − ε ≤ c′εij ≤ c′ij + ε
• If σ(i, j) < σ(k, l) then cεij < cεkl and c′εij < c′εkl.
• t is a minimal tree in Cε, C ′ε, and Cε + C ′ε.
Notice that Cε and C ′ε satisfy the condition in the first case studied. So,
fP,t(N,M,Cε + C ′ε) = fP,t(N,M,Cε) + fP,t(N,M,C ′ε).
Finally, taking into account the definition of the rule fP,t, we have that
limε→0 fP,t(N,M,Cε) = fP,t(N,M,C), limε→0 fP,t(N,M,C ′ε) = fP,t(N,M,C ′)
and limε→0 fP,t(N,M,Cε + C ′ε) = fP,t(N,M,C + C ′). Thus,
fP,t(N,M,C + C ′) = fP,t(N,M,C) + fP,t(N,M,C ′).
We now prove that for each problem (N,M,C) and every minimal tree t the
painting rule associated with t coincides with the folk rule. Thus, the painting
rule is well defined and is independent of the minimal tree t and the tree t∗
computed in Phase 1.
Proposition 2. For every problem (N,M,C) and every minimal tree t for
(N,M,C),
fP,t(N,M,C) = F (N,M,C).
Proof. By Lemma 1, we know that C =
m(C)∑
q=1
xqCq where for each q, (N,M,Cq)
is a simple problem. Besides t is a minimal tree for each (N,M,Cq). By
Proposition 1 and the definition of the folk rule F , it is enough to prove that
fP,t(N,M,Cq) = F (N,M,Cq) when (N,M,Cq) is a simple problem and t is a
minimal tree in (N,M,Cq).
Let t∗ be a tree obtained on Phase 1. For all i ∈ N , let iM ∈ N ∪M denote
the immediate successor of i in the unique path from i to M in t∗. Now, we
apply the procedure of Phase 2:
Stage 1 : Take i ∈ N .
• ∀i ∈ N , e1i (Cq, t∗) = (i, iM ).
• ∀i ∈ N , N1iiM (Cq, t∗) = {i}.
13
Let P = {S1, ..., Sp} be the partition of N ∪ M in Cq-components. We
consider several cases:
Case 1 : S(i, P ) ∩M 6= ∅, for all i ∈ N . Then,
• c1(Cq, t∗) = 0.
• ∀i ∈ N , p1i (Cq, t∗) = 0.
• E1(Cq, t∗) = ∅.
Then, γ = 1 and ∀i ∈ N ,
p2i (C
q, t∗) =
|Sk : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N | .
Thus, ∀i ∈ N ,
fP,ti (N,M,C
q) =
|Sk : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N | = F (N,M,C
q).
Case 2 : |S(i, P )| = 1, for all i ∈ N . Then S(i, P ) ∩M = ∅, ∀i ∈ N . Now
• c1(Cq, t∗) = 1.
• ∀i ∈ N , p1i (Cq, t∗) = 1 =
1
|S(i, P )| .
• E1(Cq, t∗) = ∅.
As in the first case, γ = 1 and ∀i ∈ N
p2i (C
q, t∗) =
|Sk : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N | .
Therefore
fP,ti (N,M,C
q) =
1
|S(i, P )| +
|Sk : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N | = F (N,M,C
q).
Case 3 : Otherwise.
• c1(Cq, t∗) = 0.
• ∀i ∈ N , p1i (Cq, t∗) = 0.
• E1(Cq, t∗) = {(i, iM ) ∈ E0 : cq
iiM
= 1} 6= ∅.
Stage 2 :
• Let i ∈ N . If S(i, P ) ∩M 6= ∅, then e2i (Cq, t∗) = ∅. If S(i, P ) ∩M = ∅,
there exists a unique j ∈ S(i, P ) such that (j, jM ) ∈ E1. Thus e2i (Cq, t∗) =
(j, jM ).
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• N2
e2i
(Cq, t∗) = S(i, P ).
• c2(Cq, t∗) = 1.
• For each i ∈ N ,
p2i (C
q, t∗) =
 0, if S(i, P ) ∩M 6= ∅1|S(i, P )| , otherwise.
• E2(Cq, t∗) = ∅.
In this case, γ = 2 and ∀i ∈ N
p3i (C
q, t∗) =
|Sk : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N | .
Then,
fP,ti (N,M,C
q) =

|Sk : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N | , if S(i, P ) ∩M 6= ∅
1
|S(i, P )| +
|Sk : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N | , otherwise.
Therefore, fP,ti (N,M,C
q) = Fi(N,M,C
q), for all i ∈ N .
Since the rule coincides with the folk rule, which does not depend on the
tree t chosen, the rule can be denoted by fP instead of fP,t.
Bergantin˜os et al. (2017) extend the folk rule for mcstp with multiple sources
using four approaches: As the Shapley value of the irreducible game (Bergantin˜os
and Vidal-Puga (2007)), as an obligation rule (Tijs et al. (2006) and Bergantin˜os
and Kar (2010)), as a partition rule (Bergantin˜os et al. (2010, 2011)), and
through a cone-wise decomposition (Branzei et al. (2004) and Bergantin˜os and
Vidal-Puga (2009)). Thus, the painting rule is a new way of calculating the
extension of the folk rule to this context. The main advantage of this approach
is that it makes it very clear that the allocation of an agent given by the folk
rule depends only on her path to the sources and the connection cost between
them in the irreducible problem.
4. An axiomatic characterization
This section presents an axiomatic characterization of the painting rule. In
their Corollary 1, Bergantin˜os et al. (2014) characterize the folk rule in classical
minimum cost spanning tree problems with the properties of cost monotonicity,
symmetry, cone-wise additivity, and isolated agents. We extend this charac-
terization to the case of multiple sources by considering these four axioms and
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adding a new one called equal treatment of source costs. The definition of the
properties of cost monotonicity, symmetry, and cone-wise additivity in the case
of multiple sources is the same as in the classical case. The definition of isolated
agents is not straightforward. Equal treatment of source costs is a property
defined only in the case of multiple sources.
A rule f for mcstp with multiple sources satisfies:
Cone-wise additivity (CA). Let (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′) be two mcstp with
multiple sources satisfying that there is an order σ over the set of edges of
N ∪M such that for all i, j, k, l ∈ N ∪M satisfying that σ(i, j) < σ(k, l), then
cij ≤ ckl and c′ij ≤ c′kl. Thus,
f(N,M,C + C ′) = f(N,M,C) + f(N,M,C ′).
CA says that the rule should be additive on the cost function C when re-
stricted to cones.
Cost monotonicity (CM). For all (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′) such that C ≤ C ′,
then
f(N,M,C) ≤ f(N,M,C ′).
CM says that if a certain number of connection costs increase and the rest
(if any) remain the same, no agent should end up better off.
Symmetry (SYM). For all (N,M,C) and all i, j ∈ N such that cik = cjk,
∀k ∈ (N ∪M)\{i, j}, then
fi(N,M,C) = fj(N,M,C).
If two agents are symmetrical with respect to their connection costs, SYM
says that they should pay the same.
The next property is inspired by the isolated agents property introduced in
Bergantin˜os et al. (2014) for source connection problems.
An agent i ∈ N is called isolated in a problem (N,M,C) if cij = x, for all
j ∈ (N ∪M)\{i} and cjk ≤ x, for all j, k ∈ (N ∪M)\{i}. Notice that if agent i
is isolated, then agent i does not benefit from connecting to the sources through
agents in N\{i}.
Isolated agents (IA). For all (N,M,C) such that for all k, l ∈M , there is a path
from k to l, gkl, such that c(gkl) = 0,
fi(N,M,C) = x,
for every isolated agent i ∈ N .
If there is a way of connecting all sources to one another for free (not nec-
essarily directly), an isolated agent should only pay her connection cost to any
node.
Equal treatment of sources costs (ETSC). For each pair of problems (N,M,C)
and (N,M,C ′) such that there exist k, l ∈ M , k 6= l, such that ckl < c′kl and
cij = c
′
ij otherwise, then for each i, j ∈ N
fi(N,M,C
′)− fi(N,M,C) = fj(N,M,C ′)− fj(N,M,C).
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This property was introduced in Bergantin˜os et al. (2017). It says that if
the cost between two sources increases, then all agents should be affected in the
same way.
In the next theorem, we present the characterization of the painting rule.
Theorem 1. The painting rule fP is the unique rule satisfying CA, CM, SYM,
IA and ETSC.
Proof. First we prove that the painting rule satisfies the five properties. Bergantin˜os
et al. (2017) proved that the folk rule satisfies CA CM, SYM and ETSC. By
Proposition 2, fP satisfies CA CM, SYM and ETSC.
We now prove that fP satisfies IA. Let i ∈ N be an isolated agent for a
problem (N,M,C). Let t be a minimal tree for (N,M,C). We can take t in
such a way that no agent in N\{i} is connected to any source through agent i.
Namely, for each j ∈ N\{i} and each k ∈M , i /∈ tjk.
Since there is a path at cost zero to join together every two sources, the tree
obtained in Phase 1, t∗, is such that c(t∗M ) = 0.
We now apply Phase 2. Since no agent is connected to the source through
agent i and cik = x ≥ cjk, ∀j, k ∈ (N ∪M)\{i}, we have that, for each δ =
1, ..., γ, eδi = (i, i
M ) and eδj 6= (i, iM ), for all j ∈ N\{i}.
Then,
fPi (N,M,C) = ciiM +
c(t∗M )
|N | = x+ 0 = x.
Thus, fP satisfies IA.
We now prove the uniqueness. Let f be a rule satisfying the properties of
Theorem 1. By CA, it is enough to prove that f = fP in simple problems.
Let (N,M,C) be a simple problem and P = {S1, ..., Sp} the set of C-
components. Consider the next cost function:
c′ij =
{
cij , if {i, j} ∩N 6= ∅
0, otherwise.
We have a simple problem (N,M,C ′) such that all sources are connected to
one another at cost zero and C ≥ C ′.
For each Sk ∈ P such that Sk ∩M = ∅, we define a pair of cost function as
follows:
ckij =
{
1, if {i, j} ∩ Sk 6= ∅
0, otherwise
and
c′kij =
{
c′ij , if {i, j} ∩ Sk 6= ∅
0, otherwise.
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We first analyze how f works on (N,M,Ck) and (N,M,C ′k). Let Sk ∈ P
with Sk ∩M = ∅ and i ∈ N .
• On (N,M,Ck). If i ∈ Sk, i is an isolated agent. By IA, fi(N,M,Ck) = 1,
for all i ∈ Sk. Besides, m(N,M,Ck) = |Sk|. Since all agents in N\Sk are
symmetric, fi(N,M,C
k) = 0, for all i /∈ Sk. This is,
fi(N,M,C
k) =
{
1, if i ∈ Sk
0, otherwise.
• On (N,M,C ′k). We have that C ′k ≤ Ck. If i /∈ Sk, by CM, fi(N,M,C ′k) ≤
fi(N,M,C
k) = 0. It is straightforward to see that if a rule satisfies CM
and SYM, then it should be non-negative. Then, fi(N,M,C
k) = 0 if
i /∈ Sk. All agents on Sk are symmetric and m(N,M,C ′k) = 1. Thus,
fi(N,M,C
′k) =

1
|Sk| , if i ∈ Sk
0, otherwise.
Take i ∈ N and let S(i, P ) denote the C-component to which i belongs. We
consider two cases.
• S(i, P ) ∩M = ∅. Since C ′ ≥ C ′k and CM,
fi(N,M,C
′) ≥ fi(N,M,C ′k) = 1|S(i, P )| .
• S(i, P ) ∩M 6= ∅. Since a rule satisfying CM and SYM should be non-
negative
fi(N,M,C
′) ≥ 0.
Taking into account that m(N,M,C ′) = |Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M = ∅| and∑
i∈N
fi(N,M,C
′) ≥
∑
i∈N |S(i,P )∩M=∅
1
|S(i, P )| = |Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M = ∅|,
we conclude that
fi(N,M,C
′) =

1
|S(i, P )| , if S(i, P ) ∩M = ∅
0, otherwise.
Finally, notice that the cost functions C and C ′ are as the definition of
ETSC. Then, for all i, j ∈ N ,
fi(N,M,C)− fi(N,M,C ′) = fj(N,M,C)− fj(N,M,C ′).
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Fix i ∈ N ,
|N |[fi(N,M,C)− fi(N,M,C ′)] =
∑
j∈N
[fj(N,M,C)− fj(N,M,C ′)]
=
∑
j∈N
fj(N,M,C)−
∑
j∈N
fj(N,M,C
′)
= |P | − 1− (|P | − |Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅|)
= |Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1.
Thus,
fi(N,M,C) =
|Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N | + fi(N,M,C
′)
=

|Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N | +
1
|S(i, P )| , if S(i, P ) ∩M = ∅
|Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N | , otherwise.
Therefore, f(N,M,C) = F (N,M,C). By Proposition 2, f(N,M,C) =
fP (N,M,N).
Next we prove that all properties are needed in the previous characterization.
CA is independent of the other properties. Consider the rule fe defined
in Bergantin˜os et al. (2017) when they prove that CA is independent of the
properties they use in Theorem 2. fe satisfies all properties but CA.
CM is independent of the other properties. Given a problem (N,M,C), let
t be a mt of (N,M,C) and t∗ a mt of (N,M,C∗) obtained through Phase 1.
We now consider the following classical mcstp (N0, C), where c0i = max{c∗kl :
(k, l) ∈ t∗ij for some j ∈M and k, l ∈ N} and cij = c∗ij , for all i, j ∈ N .
For a classical problem with a single mt, Bird (1976) proposed a rule called
the Bird rule. This rule is obtained by requiring each agent to pay the total
cost of the first edge in her unique path to the source. Dutta and Kar (2004)
extended the Bird rule when there is more than one mt (an extension we denote
as B). This rule is the average of the allocations given by the Bird rule on all
the minimal trees associated with Prim’s algorithm.
We now extend it to our setting in the following way:
fB(N,M,C) = B(N0, C) +
c(t∗M )
|N | .
fB satisfies all properties but CM.
SYM is independent of the other properties. For each problem (N,M,C)
and each δ = 1, ..., n+m− 1, let (iδ, jδ) denote the edge selected by Kruskal’s
algorithm at stage δ and gδ be the set of all edges selected according to Kruskal’s
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algorithm until stage δ (included). Besides P (gδ) denotes the partition of N∪M
in connected components induced by gδ.
Given a partition P we define the function α as
αi(P ) =

if S(i, P ) ∩M = ∅|Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N | + 1, and i ≤ j,∀j ∈ S(i, P )
|Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N | , otherwise,
Thus we define the rule fα such that for each problem (N,M,C) and each
i ∈ N ,
fαi (N,M,C) =
n+m−1∑
δ=1
ciδjδ [αi(P (g
δ−1))− αi(P (gδ))].
fα satisfies all properties but SYM.
IA is independent of the other properties. Let E be the rule in which the
cost of the minimal tree is divided equally among all agents. Namely, for each
problem (N,M,C) and each i ∈ N ,
Ei(N,M,C) =
m(N,M,C)
|N | .
This rule satisfies all properties but IA.
ETSC is independent of the other properties. Let (N,M,C) be a problem.
If N = {1, 2} and M = {a1, a2}, let us define the sets N ′ = {1, 2, a2} and
M ′ = {a1}. Then, for every i ∈ N , we define the rule
fi(N,M,C) =
 fPi (N ′,M ′, C) +
fPa2(N
′,M ′, C)
2
, if N = {1, 2} and M = {a1, a2}
fPi (N,M,C), otherwise.
This rule satisfies all properties but ETSC.
We end this paper by mentioning other properties mey by the rule. These
properties are introduced in Bergantin˜os et al. (2017).
Independence of irrelevant trees (IIT). For each (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′), if
they have a common minimal tree t such that cij = c
′
ij for each (i, j) ∈ t, then
f(N,M,C) = f(N,M,C ′).
This property requires the cost allocation chosen by a rule to depend only
on the edges that belong to a minimal tree.
Core selection (CS). For each (N,M,C) and each S ⊆ N , ∑i∈S fi(N,M,C) ≤
m(S,M,C).
CS implies that no coalition of agents would be better off by constructing
their own minimal tree.
Separability (SEP). For each (N,M,C) and each S ⊆ N , if m(N,M,C) =
m(S,M,C) +m(N\S,M,C), then
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fi(N,M,C) =
{
fi(S,M,C), if i ∈ S,
fi(N\S,M,C), if i ∈ N\S.
Two subsets of agents, S and N\S can be connected to all the sources either
separately or jointly. This property implies that if the minimal costs in two
situations are the same, agents will pay the same in both circumstances.
Population monotonicity (PM). For each (N,M,C), each S ⊂ T ⊆ N and each
i ∈ S, fi(S,M,C) ≥ fi(T,M,C).
If new agents join the problem, then no agent in the original problem should
be worse off.
These properties are not completely independent. The following proposition
summarizes the relations between the properties seen in this paper.
Proposition 3. (i) CM implies IIT.
(ii) CS implies AI.
(iii) SEP implies AI.
(iv) PM implies SEP, CS and IA.
Proof. (i) It appears in Bergantin˜os et al. (2017).
(ii) It is easy to see that CS implies IA noticing that, if i ∈ N is an
isolated agent in (N,M,C), then m(N,M,C) = m(N\{i},M,C) + x. Since∑
j∈N\{i} fj(N,M,C) ≤ m(N\{i},M,C) and fi(N,M,C) ≤ x, we have that
fi(N,M,C) = x.
(iii) It is similar to Case (ii).
(iv) Bergantin˜os et al. (2017) prove that PM implies SEP and CS. By (ii),
PM also implies IA.
Bergantin˜os et al. (2017) also provide two characterizations of the folk rule
in minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources. As in Theorem
1, they use CA, SYM, and ETSC. In both cases they also use IIT and com-
plete one characterization with CS and the other with SEP. Thus, the three
characterizations are unrelated. Namely, no characterization is a consequence
of another.
Apart from this, the proof of uniqueness in the characterization of this paper
and the proof of uniqueness in the characterizations of Bergantin˜os et al. (2017)
are also unrelated. In all three cases the first step is the same. By CA we can
consider only simple games. But now the arguments are completely different.
In this paper we consider the problems C ′, C ′k, and Ck and depending on how
a rule works in such problems uniqueness is obtained. Bergantin˜os et al. (2017)
obtain uniqueness by considering the expression of the folk rule as an obligation
rule.
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